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Beyond the predictable: 
demographic changes in the EU up to 2050 
The European Union has had a number of demographic surprises over the last 30 years. Fertility levels 
have dropped dramatically, life expectancy has continued to increase strongly and most Member States 
of the EU have become immigration countries. Consequently, the number of young people has declined 
significantly (by around 20%), whereas both those of working age and the elderly continued to grow in 
number. 
What might happen in the next 50 years? Will the EU soon be confronted with a shrinking working age 
population? Will the under-20s be outnumbered by the over-60s? What can we say about the future 
demographic differences between EU countries ? 
These and other questions are answered in this bulletin. Based upon five different but internationally 
consistent long-term population scenarios, a dozen principal future demographic trends are presented. A 
summary table concerning the key-assumptions of the scenarios can be found in the middle of this 
publication; a brief technical explanation is given at the end. 
The EU's share in world population will 
continue to diminish 
With its 373 million inhabitants on 1 January 1996, 
the European Union is the third largest world demo-
graphic power after China (1.204 billion) and India 
(944 million). It is ahead of the United States (264 mil-
lion). 
However, the EU's share in world population is dimin-
ishing. In 1950 the EU embraced almost 12% of 
mankind. Currently that figure is less than 7%, and if 
current fertility, mortality and international migration 
trends persist (baseline scenario), by the year 2050 
no more than 4% will live in the EU (Figure 1). Even 
if fertility recovers and net migration returns to some-
what higher levels than actually observed (high sce-
nario), this proportion will further decline. 
Figure 1 
EU population as a % of total world population 
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Towards a shrinking population? 
Figure 2 demonstrates that sooner or later total EU 
population will stagnate and decline. According to the 
low scenario, 'depopulation' will already occur within ten 
years, and by the year 2050 the total number of inhabi­
tants will be very close to that observed in 1950. 
The baseline scenario expects a population to peak 
around 2025, and a total population in 2050 close to the 
current one. Only the high scenario foresees a continu­
ous increase over the next five decades, resulting ir, an 
EU population of 444 million in 2050. This is 20% more 
than the current population. 
Within the Union, future population growth will be farfrom 
uniform. According to the baseline scenario, Italy will be 
already confronted with a population decline within 12 
years, whilst both Luxembourg and Sweden will escape 
this experience (Figure 3). 
Figure 2 
Total population - EUR 15 
250 
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
year 
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Table 1 
Population at 1 January \m 
EUR 15 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spam 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portugal 
Finland 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
Iceland 
Liechtenstein 
Norway 
EEA 
1995 
OBSERVED 
2000 
LOW BASELINE HIGH 
2020 
LOW BASELINE HIGH 
2050 
LOW BASELINE HIGH 
(1000) 
371 575 
10 131 
5216 
81 539 
10 443 
39 177 
58 020 
3 580 
57 269 
407 
15 424 
8 040 
9 912 
5 099 
8816 
58 504 
267 
31 
4 348 
376 221 
373 791 
10 171 
5 271 
82 323 
10 539 
39 239 
58 815 
3 594 
56 911 
428 
15 684 
8 076 
9911 
5 135 
8 852 
58 842 
276 
31 
4 421 
378 519 
376 961 
10 252 
5 321 
83 123 
10 643 
39 544 
59 179 
3 625 
57 455 
435 
15 868 
8 144 
9 993 
5 178 
8 932 
59 269 
278 
32 
4 462 
381 733 
380 545 
10 332 
5 365 
84 013 
10 720 
39 946 
59 710 
3 661 
57 997 
440 
15 982 
8 234 
10 085 
5 231 
9 034 
59 795 
2 79 
32 
4 495 
385 351 
363 785 
9 898 
5 075 
79 074 
10 450 
37B09 
59 307 
3 652 
52 753 
445 
15819 
7 882 
9 808 
5 008 
8 792 
58 013 
294 
32 
4 494 
368 605 
388 232 
10 658 
5 526 
84 670 
11 269 
40 307 
62 831 
3 909 
56 543 
501 
17 204 
8 443 
10513 
5 350 
9 470 
61 038 
3" 
35 
4 851 
393 429 
416 382 
11 270 
5 950 
91 559 
11 900 
43 504 
66 896 
4 248 
60 334 
555 
18319 
9 231 
11 265 
5 777 
10 248 
65 326 
326 
38 
5 156 
421 902 
303 475 
8 378 
4 296 
63 420 
9 060 
30 451 
52 349 
3 095 
40 457 
408 
13 747 
6610 
8 582 
4 178 
7 964 
50 480 
26C 
2 5 
4 095 
307 855 
367 729 
10 428 
5 542 
77 089 
11 242 
36 736 
62 063 
3818 
49 287 
563 
17 564 
8 241 
10 681 
5 078 
10 082 
59 315 
3" 
33 
5 161 
373 234 
444 821 
12 142 
6 675 
94 885 
12 978 
45 120 
73 940 
4 766 
59 586 
714 
20 719 
10 349 
12 601 
6210 
12210 
71 926 
332 
42 
6 065 
451 280 
Deaths will outnumber births 
The principal reason why the EU population will start to 
decline is the 'births deficit' of postwar generations. 
People born after 1945 have or are expected to have too 
few children to replace themselves. Therefore, sooner or 
later the number of deaths will start to exceed the number 
of live births (Figure 4). 
If fertility levels continue to decrease (low scenario), this 
demographic break-even point will already have been 
reached in 1997. If fertility recovers considerably, to 
levels of about 1.95 children per woman (high scenario), 
natural population loss will not appear in the next 3-4 
decades. 
Several EU countries have already experienced natural 
decrease. Germany has been confronted with such a 
situation continuously since 1972. Currently Italy, too, is 
losing population through natural decrease. 
In the short and medium term all the southern Member 
States will probably follow, as will Austria and Denmark. 
In the long run all other EU countries will face natural 
population decline. 
Figure 4 
Live births minus deaths - EUR 15 
millions 
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
year 
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Migration will continue to play a major role 
Since the mid-1980s international migration has rapidly 
gained importance as a component of population growth. 
During the period 1990-1994, net migration (immigrants 
less emigrants) to the EU amounted to well over 5 million 
people. The contribution of migration to population 
growth rose to around 70%. 
In all scenarios it is expected that Europe will remain an 
attractive region for immigrants. Basically depending on 
economic developments and migration policies, net mi­
gration will in the medium and long run vary between 400 
and 800 thousand persons a year {Figure 5). 
Due to diminishing economic disparities and the intro­
duction of some kind of burden sharing for asylum seek­
ers, the southern Member States will probably get a 
larger proportion of the total inflow. However, Germany 
will continue to be the most popular immigration country 
(Table 3). 
Figure 5 
Net migration1 - EUR 15 
Γ37Ά 
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For the period 1950-1994 calculated as total population growth 
minus live births plus deaths 
Decline in total fertility will stop 
During the last 30 years the EU reproductive patterns 
changed considerably. A fast and still-growing propor-
tion of women had few children and postponed mother-
hood. As a result the total fertility rate, which is affected 
by both the number and timing of births, has declined 
sharply to historically low levels of around 1.45 children 
per woman (Figure 6). 
This trend will soon come to an end. If the vast majority 
of women born during the 1960s and 1970s are able to 
realise their family ambitions and therefore catch up 
rapidly with postponed births (high scenario), the total 
fertility rate could rapidly rise to levels very close to the 
observed average family size of women born in the early 
1950s: 1.95 children per woman. 
If these generations never catch up, and consequently 
around 30% of the women remain childless (low sce-
nario), the total fertility rate will hardly change at all. 
In all scenarios it is assumed that current international 
fertility differences will persist. Therefore, in the long run 
the highest total fertility rates are expected in Finland, 
France, Ireland, Sweden and United Kingdom, and the 
lowest in Germany, Italy and Spain (Table 3). 
Figure 6 
Total fertility rate - EUR 15 
children per woman 
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Life expectancy will continue to increase; gender 
gap might diminish somewhat 
Since 1945 life expectancy at birth in the EU has in-
creased almost continuously. The total gain amounts to 
well over 10 years. Based on the recently observed 
mortality rates, women and men are expected to live on 
average 80 and 73.5 years respectively {Figure 7). 
During the next 50 years a further fairly substantial 
increase in longevity might occur. If medicines, preven-
tive and curative health services, healthy life-styles, etc. 
continue to improve (high scenario), life expectancy at 
birth for women might reach around 87 years in 2050. 
For men maximum levels of around 83 years seem 
plausible, so that the gender gap might diminish some-
what. 
However, if the further development of positive influ-
ences on mortality slows down shortly and is increasingly 
counteracted by negative influences such as cigarette-
smoking and stress, progress in life expectancy could 
start to stagnate and the gender gap would then not 
narrow (low scenario). 
Current differences between countries in life expectan-
cies are assumed to remain stable (low scenario) or to 
narrow somewhat (baseline and high scenarios). So, 
Sweden and France (females only) continue to be the 
EU countries with the highest life expectancies, whereas 
the lowest levels are expected in Denmark, Ireland, 
Portugal and Finland (males only) (Table 3). 
Figure 7 
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Fewer young people? 
During the period 1975­1995 the number of people aged 
under 20 within the EU dropped from 110 million to 
90 million (Figure 8) . 
If current low fertility levels persist, a further reduction will 
take place. In this case, in 2050 the Union will comprise 
no more than 52 million young people. However, if fertility 
catches up strongly, the number of young people in the 
EU could steadily rise to a level of almost 100 million in 
2020. 
The share of the young in the total population, currently 
24%, will certainly continue to decline up to the year 2000 
(Table 2). Thereafter, this process of 'dejuvenation' 
might stop. By 2050 the proportion of young people could 
lie between 16 and 24%. 
According to the baseline scenario almost all EU coun­
tries will lose young people during the period 1995­2020 
(Figure 9). Ireland in particular will be confronted with a 
steep decline. Luxembourg, on the other hand, seems 
to escape any further decline. 
The Irish population is currently by far the youngest of 
the Union (34%), whereas Germany and Italy are the 
most dejuvenated countries (21%). In the coming dec­
ades this difference will certainly diminish. By the year 
2050, Finland, Ireland and Sweden could be the young­
est countries (18­26%), and Italy and Spain the most 
dejuvenated (14­22%). 
Figure 8 
Population aged under 20 ­ EUR 15 
Figure 9 
Population aged under 20: change 1995­2020 (%) 
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Table 2 
Population aged under 20 as a % of total population 
^ 
EUR 15 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portugal 
Finland 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
Iceland 
Liechtenstein 
Norway 
EEA 
1995 
OBSERVED 
23.9 
24 1 
2 3 6 
21.5 
2 4 4 
25.0 
26.1 
33.9 
21.5 
2 3 8 
24 4 
23.3 
26.1 
25.5 
24 7 
25.3 
32 4 
2 5 4 
25.7 
2 3 9 
2000 
OLD 
22 9 
23 3 
23 3 
2 ' 2 
22 C 
21 6 
25 * 
3 : ­
' 9 6 
24 4 
2 3 9 
22 7 
23 2 
24 6 
2 4 4 
25 ' 
30 5 
¿4 ' 
25 5 
22 5 
BASELINE 
23 1 
23 7 
23 8 
2 ' 6 
22 5 
21 9 
25 4 
3 ' : 
2 : : 
24 β 
24 4 
23 ' 
22 c 
24 ­. 
24 7 
25 4 
30 Β 
24 ­: 
25 9 
23 · 
YOUNG 
23.5 
24 :■ 
24 1 
22 0 
22 7 
2'¿ 4 
25 S 
31 2 
23 5 
25 2 
24 6 
23 5 
23 9 
25 2 
25 1 
25 ? 
3' : 
25 : 
26 2 
23 6 
2020 
OLD 
•8 
•9 
' 9 
•6 
•8 
17 
2 C 
23 
•6 
' 9 
19 
' 7 
2 : 
2 : 
20 
29 
22 
17 
23 
' 8 
BASELINE 
2 · 
22 
22 
19 
22 
22 
23 
25 
•9 
22 
22 
20 
22 
22 
23 
22 
24 
20 
2 3 
2 ' 
YOUNG 
24 
24 
25 
22 
24 
24 
26 
29 
22 
25 
24 
23 
25 
25 
25 
25 
25 
22 
25 
24 
autwM 
2050 
OLD 
16 
'6 
17 
•4 
'5 
14 
17 
•9 
14 
17 
•5 
•6 
IB 
•3 
17 
17 
•4 
•e 
16 
BASELINE 
19 
21 
22 
■ o 
20 
18 
21 
21 
•7 
22 
2 ' 
19 
2 ' 
21 
22 
21 
21 
■3 
22 
19 
YOUNG 
24 
25 
25 
23 
23 
22 
25 
26 
22 
26 
25 
24 
2 4 
26 
26 
26 
24 
23 
26 
24 
Table 3: Key-assumptions used for long-term population scenarios 
Total fertility rate 
LOW/OLD 
1995 
2000 
2020 
2050 
BASELINE 
1995 
2000 
2020 
2050 
HIGH/YOUNG 
1995 
2000 
2020 
2050 
Life expectancy at birth 
LOW/YOUNG 
1995 
2000 
2020 
2050 
BASELINE 
1995 
2000 
2020 
2050 
HIGH/OLD 
1995 
2000 
2020 
2050 
Life expectancy at birth, 
LOW/YOUNG 
1995 
2000 
2020 
2050 
BASELINE 
1995 
2000 
2020 
2050 
HIGH/OLD 
1995 
2000 
2020 
2050 
Net migration (1000) 
LOW/OLD 
1995 
2000 
2020 
2050 
BASELINE 
1995 
2000 
2020 
2050 
HIGH/YOUNG 
1995 
2000 
2020 
2050 
EUR15 | 
1.41 
1.40 
1.43 
1.45 
1.45 
1.55 
1.65 
1.66 
1.50 
1.75 
1.94 
1.94 
males 
73.5 
73.9 
75.3 
75.8 
73.9 
74.7 
77.8 
79.7 
74.3 
75.5 
80.2 
82.7 
females 
80.1 
80.5 
81.7 
82.2 
80.4 
81.1 
83.6 
85.1 
80.7 
81.7 
85.1 
86.9 
647.1 
410.8 
396.0 
396.0 
761.7 
679.3 
591.8 
591.8 
869.7 
1009.9 
787.6 
787.6 
Β I 
1 51 
1.46 
1.50 
1 50 
1.57 
1.67 
1.80 
1.80 
1.60 
1.81 
2.00 
2.00 
73.3 
74.0 
75.5 
76.0 
73.6 
74.8 
78.7 
800 
73.9 
75.6 
80.8 
83.0 
80.0 
807 
81.7 
82.0 
802 
81.3 
84.2 
85.0 
80.4 
81.9 
85.7 
87.0 
15.0 
59 
10.0 
10.0 
18.0 
10.2 
15.0 
15.0 
21.0 
18.0 
20.0 
20.0 
DK 
1.72 
1.55 
1 50 
1.50 
1.79 
1.77 
1.79 
1.80 
1.82 
1.94 
2.00 
2.00 
72.6 
72.9 
74.0 
75.0 
72.9 
73.7 
77.1 
79.0 
73.3 
74.6 
79.5 
82.0 
77.8 
77.9 
78.6 
79.5 
780 
78.5 
80.8 
83.0 
78.3 
79.3 
83.1 
85.0 
276 
60 
5.0 
5.0 
28.6 
11.0 
10.0 
10.0 
29.6 
16.0 
150 
15.0 
D I 
1 24 
1.26 
1.30 
1.30 
1.28 
1 41 
1.50 
1.50 
1.33 
1.62 
1 80 
1 80 
72.9 
73.3 
74.7 
75.0 
73.4 
74.1 
77.4 
79.0 
73.7 
75.0 
79.8 
82.0 
79.4 
79.8 
81.1 
81.5 
79.7 
80.4 
82.9 
84.0 
80.0 
81.1 
84.4 
86.0 
390.0 
300.0 
150.0 
150.0 
420.0 
390.6 
200.0 
2000 
450.0 
500.0 
250.0 
250.0 
EL | 
1.34 
1 36 
1.40 
1.40 
1.40 
1.59 
1.70 
1.70 
1.43 
1.72 
1.90 
1.90 
75.0 
75.5 
76.8 
77.5 
75.3 
76.3 
79.4 
81.0 
75.6 
77.0 
81.8 
84.0 
80.0 
80.5 
81.7 
82.0 
80.2 
81.1 
83.6 
85.0 
80.4 
81.7 
85.1 
87.0 
25.0 
13.8 
200 
20.0 
30.0 
21.7 
25.0 
25.0 
35.0 
29.5 
30.0 
30.0 
E I 
1.22 
1.22 
1.28 
1.30 
1.24 
1.36 
1.50 
1.50 
1.30 
1.59 
1.80 
1.80 
73.6 
73.6 
74.5 
75.5 
74.0 
74.4 
76.7 
79.0 
74.5 
75.3 
79.8 
82.0 
81.1 
81.2 
82.2 
82.5 
81.4 
81.8 
84.0 
85.0 
81.7 
82.3 
85.4 
87.0 
18.3 
49 
40.0 
40.0 
28.5 
31.1 
60.0 
60.0 
38.7 
572 
80.0 
800 
F | 
1.64 
1.62 
1.55 
1.60 
1.66 
1.73 
1.80 
1.80 
1.72 
1.97 
2.10 
2.10 
73.6 
74.0 
75.6 
76.0 
74.0 
74.8 
78.3 
800 
74.3 
75.6 
80.3 
83.0 
81.6 
82.2 
83.6 
84.0 
81.9 
82.8 
85.4 
870 
82.2 
83.2 
86.6 
880 
40.0 
20.4 
30.0 
30.0 
50.0 
50.1 
50.0 
50.0 
60.0 
79.8 
70.0 
70.0 
IRL 
1.86 
1.67 
1.60 
1.60 
1.90 
1.83 
1.79 
1.80 
1.94 
2.02 
2.10 
2.10 
72.7 
73.2 
74.5 
75.0 
73.0 
74.0 
77.2 
79.0 
73.4 
74.9 
79.6 
82.0 
78.3 
78.8 
80.0 
80.5 
78.5 
79.4 
82.3 
84.0 
78.8 
80.2 
84.1 
86.0 
-10.0 
-10.0 
-5 0 
-5 0 
-8 4 
-7.7 
-2.7 
-2 7 
-6 8 
-3.4 
-0 4 
0 4 
' I 
1.18 
1.20 
1.27 
1.30 
1 22 
1.37 
1.50 
1.50 
1.27 
1 58 
1 80 
1.80 
742 
74.3 
75.6 
76.0 
74.8 
75.1 
78.3 
80.0 
75.1 
75.9 
80.4 
83.0 
80.9 
81.1 
82.1 
82.5 
81.3 
81.7 
84.0 
85.0 
81.5 
822 
85.4 
870 
20.0 
20.0 
60.0 
60.0 
50.0 
50.0 
80.0 
80.0 
80.0 
80.0 
100.0 
100.0 
L 
1.67 
1.55 
1.50 
1.50 
1 71 
1.72 
1.79 
1.80 
1.74 
1.89 
2.00 
2.00 
72.6 
73.6 
75.2 
75.5 
72.9 
74.4 
78.8 
80.0 
73.2 
75.3 
80.7 
83.0 
79.2 
79.7 
81.0 
81.5 
79.4 
80.3 
83.4 
85.0 
79.7 
81.0 
85.3 
87.0 
4.1 
2.0 
1 0 
1 0 
46 
3.1 
2.0 
20 
5 1 
43 
3.0 
3.0 
Table 3: Key-assumptions used for long-term population scenarios 
NL 
1.52 
1.47 
1.50 
1.50 
1.58 
1.67 
1.80 
1.80 
1.59 
1 74 
1.99 
2.00 
74.4 
74.7 
75.7 
76.5 
74.6 
75.5 
78.2 
80.0 
74.9 
76.3 
80.8 
83.0 
A I 
1.36 
1.34 
1.37 
1.40 
1.39 
1.52 
1.60 
1.60 
1.44 
1 71 
1.90 
1.90 
73.2 
73.7 
75.2 
75.5 
73.6 
74.5 
76.6 
80.0 
74.0 
75.3 
80.3 
83.0 
p I 
1.40 
1.38 
1.40 
1.40 
1.45 
1.53 
1.69 
1.70 
1.48 
1.67 
1.90 
1.90 
70.7 
71.1 
72.3 
73.0 
71.0 
71.9 
75.3 
78.0 
71.4 
72.9 
78.5 
82.0 
FIN 
1.80 
1.68 
1.60 
1.60 
1 84 
1.84 
1.80 
1.80 
1.89 
2.03 
2.10 
2.10 
7 2 0 
72.5 
74.0 
74.5 
72.3 
73.3 
76.6 
79.0 
72.7 
74.3 
79.5 
82.0 
s I 
1.70 
1.63 
1.60 
1.60 
1.74 
1 81 
1.90 
1.90 
1.78 
1 98 
2.10 
2.10 
75.6 
76.2 
77.7 
78.0 
75.9 
77.0 
78.9 
82.0 
76.4 
77.6 
80.4 
85.0 
UK 
1.68 
1.59 
1.60 
1.60 
1.73 
1.72 
1.79 
1.80 
1.77 
1.94 
2.10 
2 10 
73.7 
74.4 
76.0 
76.5 
74.1 
75.2 
78.3 
80.0 
74.5 
76.0 
80.4 
83.0 
is I 
2.07 
1.87 
1.80 
1.80 
2.12 
2 0 8 
2.08 
2.10 
2.15 
2.24 
2.30 
2.30 
76.0 
76.5 
77.9 
78.5 
76.4 
77.3 
8 0 2 
8 2 0 
76.7 
77.9 
82.4 
85.0 
FL 
1.36 
1.34 
1.37 
1.40 
1.39 
1.52 
1.60 
1.60 
1.44 
1 71 
1.90 
1.90 
74.9 
75.2 
76.3 
77.0 
75.2 
76.0 
78.7 
81.0 
75.5 
76.7 
81.6 
84.0 
Ν I 
1.82 
1.65 
1 60 
1.60 
1.85 
1.85 
1.89 
1.90 
1 90 
1.96 
2.09 
2.10 
74.4 
75.0 
76.4 
77.0 
74.7 
75.8 
79.0 
81.0 
75.0 
76.5 
81.3 
84.0 
EEA 
1.42 
1.40 
1.43 
1.45 
1.46 
1.55 
1.66 
1.67 
1.50 
1.75 
1.94 
1.95 
To ta l fe r t i l i t y rate 
LOW/OLD 
1995 
2000 
2020 
2050 
BASELINE 
1995 
2000 
2020 
2050 
HIGH/YOUNG 
1995 
2000 
2020 
2050 
Life e x p e c t a n c y at b i r t h , ma les 
73.5 
73.9 
75.3 
75.8 
73.9 
74.7 
77.8 
79.7 
74.3 
75.6 
80.2 
82.7 
L O W / Y O U N G 
1995 
2000 
2020 
2050 
BASELINE 
1995 
2000 
2020 
2050 
HIGH/OLD 
1995 
2000 
2020 
2050 
80.3 
80.5 
81.3 
82.0 
80.5 
81.1 
83.3 
85.0 
80.7 
81.7 
84.9 
87.0 
79.6 
80.1 
81.2 
81 5 
79.9 
80.7 
82.4 
85.0 
80.2 
81.4 
84.9 
8 7 0 
78.0 
78.4 
79.6 
80.0 
78.2 
79.0 
81.9 
84.0 
78.5 
79.8 
83.5 
86.0 
79.6 
80 1 
81.2 
81.5 
79.8 
80.7 
83.3 
85.0 
80 1 
81.4 
85.1 
87.0 
80.8 
81.2 
82.5 
83.0 
81.3 
81.8 
83.4 
86.0 
81.5 
82.3 
86.3 
88.0 
79.2 
79.7 
81.0 
81.5 
7 9 5 
80.3 
83.2 
8 5 0 
79.8 
81.0 
84.6 
87.0 
81.6 
82.5 
83.8 
84.0 
81.9 
83.1 
86.0 
87.0 
82.1 
8 3 5 
87.1 
88.0 
81.5 
81 9 
83.1 
83.5 
81.7 
82.5 
84.8 
86.0 
81.9 
82.9 
87.0 
88.0 
80.3 
80.7 
81.7 
82.0 
80.6 
81.3 
83.6 
85.0 
80.8 
81.8 
85.9 
87.0 
Life expectancy at birth, females 
LOW/YOUNG 
80.1 1995 
80.5 2000 
81.7 2020 
82.2 2050 
BASELINE 
80.4 1995 
81.1 2000 
83.6 2020 
85.1 2050 
HIGH/OLD 
80.7 1995 
81.7 2000 
85.1 2020 
86.9 2050 
13.0 
10.0 
20.0 
20.0 
13.5 
33.4 
35.0 
35.0 
14.0 
56.8 
50.0 
50.0 
12 1 
9.9 
15.0 
15.0 
13.3 
14.8 
22.5 
22.5 
17.2 
26.4 
30.0 
30.0 
4 5 
5 8 
20.0 
20.0 
5 0 
12 1 
25.0 
25.0 
5.5 
28.6 
30.0 
30.0 
3 0 
-0 5 
0 0 
0 0 
3 5 
5 6 
5.0 
5 0 
4 0 
11.7 
1 0 0 
10.0 
11.5 
6 3 
10.0 
10.0 
12.0 
15.2 
20.0 
20.0 
13.5 
32.0 
30.0 
3 0 0 
73.0 
16.2 
2 0 0 
20.0 
93.0 
38.3 
45.0 
45.0 
103.0 
73.0 
70.0 
70.0 
-1.3 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
-1.4 
0.1 
0.2 
0.2 
-1.5 
0.2 
0.3 
0.3 
0.0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 1 
0 1 
ο 1 
ο 1 
0 1 
0.1 
0 1 
0 1 
6 5 
4 0 
4 0 
4 0 
7 0 
8 4 
8 0 
8 0 
7 5 
12.9 
12.0 
12.0 
652.4 
414.8 
400.0 
400.0 
767.3 
687.9 
600.0 
600.0 
875.9 
1023.2 
800.0 
800.0 
Net migration (1000) 
LOW/OLD 
1995 
2000 
2020 
2050 
BASELINE 
1995 
2000 
2020 
2050 
HIGH/YOUNG 
1995 
2000 
2020 
2050 
The working age population will sooner or later de­
cline 
For decades the Union possessed a strongly increasing 
working age population (Figure 10). Since the mid 1970's 
average growth has amounted almost 1.5 million people 
a year. 
In the near future this growth will slow down. Heavily 
depending on the net inflow of migrants, the average 
annual increase will drop to levels between 0.2 and 0.6 
million people. 
Immediately after 2005, when the first, large postwar 
'baby­boom' generations are leaving the working­age 
population, a fairly long period of decline will start. A 
stabilisation may take place around 2035, but only if 
fertility recovers structurally and net migration continues 
at rather high levels. 
Within the Union probably all countries except Luxem­
bourg will sooner or later be affected by this new demo­
graphic trend (Figure 11). Italy in particular might very 
soon be confronted with a sharply declining potential 
labour force. 
Figure 10 
Population aged 20­59 EUR 15 
Figure 11 
Population aged 20­59: change 1995­2020 (%) 
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Table 4 
Population aged 20­59 years XSA 
EUR 15 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Austna 
Portugal 
Finland 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
Iceland 
Liechtenstein 
Norway 
EEA 
1995 
OBSERVED 
2000 
LOW BASELINE HIGH 
2O20 
LOW BASELINE HIGH 
2050 
LOW BASELINE HIGH 
(1000) 
206 170 
5 533 
2 949 
47 113 
5 645 
21 300 
31 246 
1 818 
32 233 
232 
8 937 
4 578 
5 356 
2 836 
4 697 
31 698 
140 
18 
2 357 
208 686 
208 123 
5 577 
3 003 
46 249 
5 795 
22 318 
31 942 
1 928 
32 193 
240 
9 066 
4 616 
5 561 
2 863 
4 750 
32 023 
•45 
' 9 
2 436 
210 726 
208 813 
5 588 
3 011 
46 439 
5 813 
22 384 
32 033 
1 938 
32 296 
243 
9 112 
4 626 
5 576 
2 873 
4 766 
32 115 
148 
' 9 
2 445 
211 425 
209 564 
5 609 
3 020 
46 650 
5 835 
22 451 
32 121 
1 953 
32 394 
245 
9 158 
4 651 
5 6 0 0 
2 884 
4 797 
32 197 
' 4 8 
' 9 
2 453 
212 185 
197 443 
5 263 
2 764 
43 577 
5 636 
21 115 
31 153 
2 002 
28 641 
243 
8 542 
4 4 1 8 
5 482 
2 578 
4 579 
31 450 
' 5 3 
17 
2 4 1 9 
200 033 
203 550 
5 430 
2 895 
45 210 
5 8 1 8 
21 716 
31 847 
2 081 
29 444 
266 
Β 988 
4 577 
5 646 
2 661 
4 789 
32 181 
156 
18 
2 520 
206 244 
210 388 
5 592 
3 0 1 5 
47 045 
5 973 
22 450 
32 708 
2 174 
30 263 
288 
9 362 
4 8 1 3 
5 856 
2 750 
5 059 
33 040 
157 
20 
2 6 1 4 
213 179 
145 747 
4 085 
2 206 
30 958 
4 297 
13 857 
24 785 
1 469 
18 679 
207 
6 8 1 2 
3 235 
4 283 
2 081 
3 949 
24 842 
118 
·· 
2 040 
147916 
172 825 
4 950 
2 760 
36 736 
5 244 
16 597 
28 776 
1 784 
22 485 
279 
8 5 1 6 
3 988 
5 127 
2 434 
4 9 1 9 
28 230 
136 
•5 
2 507 
175 483 
206 357 
5 670 
3 267 
44 538 
5 960 
20 319 
34 002 
2 203 
26 957 
352 
9 829 
4 893 
5 922 
2 9 0 0 
5 871 
33 674 
152 
20 
2 893 
209 421 
Ageing will accelerate 
Apart from a short period of stagnation at the end of the 
1970s, the EU population aged 60 and over has in­
creased continuously since 1950 (Figure 12). Currently 
the annual growth of the elderly population fluctuates 
around a level of 0.8 million persons, or 1%. 
Up to 2005 this growth rate will hardly change. However, 
as soon as the 'baby­boomers' start to enter this age 
group, the annual increase will shift to levels of around 
1.1 million people. This will remain the case until the less 
numerous 'baby­bust' generations born in the early 
1970s pass the age of 60. 
The ever­increasing share of the elderly in the total EU 
population will also accelerate during the period 2005­
2030. From 21% now and 22% in 2005, it is expected to 
rise to a level of around 27% in the year 2020 (Table 5). 
By 2050 the proportion might lie between 27­40%. 
In all EU countries the number of old people will increase 
considerably (Figure 13). Particularly in the currently 
least aged Member States of the Union, Finland, Ireland, 
Luxembourg and Netherlands, the elderly population will 
grow rapidly. However, by 2050 Italy and Spain are 
expected to be the most aged EU countries (30­44%). 
Figure 12 
Population aged 60 and over ­ EUR 15 
Figure 13 
Population aged 60 and over: increase 1995­2020 (%) 
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Table 5 
Population aged 60 and over as a % of total population 
EUR 15 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portugal 
Finland 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
Iceland 
Liechtenstein 
Norway 
EEA 
1995 
OBSERVED 
20.6 
21.3 
19.9 
2 0 7 
21 5 
20.6 
2 0 0 
15.3 
22.2 
19.1 
17.7 
19.8 
1 9 8 
1 8 9 
22.1 
20.5 
15.0 
1 4 9 
20.1 
2 0 6 
2000 
YOUNG 
21 2 
21 6 
19 4 
22 2 
22 7 
2 ' 2 
20 2 
15 3 
23.4 
18 9 
18 ': 
' 9 8 
20 3 
19 5 
21 5 
20 2 
15 9 
152 
19 1 
2 ' 2 
BASELINE 
21 5 
2! 8 
' 9 6 
22 6 
22 9 
2 ' 5 
22 5 
15 6 
23 8 
19 2 
• 8 2 
20 1 
2" 6 
19 7 
21 9 
20 5 
i6 0 
15 5 
' 9 3 
2­ 5 
OLD 
21 8 
22 1 
199 
22 9 
23 2 
21 R 
20 7 
158 
24 0 
19 6 
185 
20 4 
2C 9 
■9 fi 
22 2 
20 7 
• 6 0 
' 5 8 
196 
21 9 
2020 
YOUNG 
25 
25 
23 
25 
25 
24 
25 
19 
27 
22 
24 
23 
22 
26 
25 
23 
25 
24 
23 
24 
BASELINE 
27 
28 
26 
28 
27 
26 
27 
22 
29 
25 
26 
2< 
24 
28 
27 
26 
26 
27 
25 
27 
OLD 
29 
30 
28 
30 
29 
2 H 
29 
24 
32 
21 
29 
28 
26 
30 
29 
27 
27 
30 
27 
29 
2050 
YOUNG 
27 
26 
23 
27 
2B 
30 
26 
25 
30 
23 
25 
26 
25 
25 
24 
25 
30 
28 
24 
27 
BASELINE 
34 
32 
29 
34 
33 
37 
33 
32 
37 
29 
30 
33 
31 
31 
29 
32 
35 
36 
29 
34 
OLD 
40 
'«8 
36 
41 
41 
.14 
38 
39 
44 
36 
37 
4· 
3fi 
36 
36 
37 
41 
44 
36 
40 
Both the working age and the elderly population 
will become older 
During the next 20 years the age structure of the EU 
population aged 20-59 will change dramatically (Fi­
gure 14). At present about 45% of the working age 
population is more than 40 years old. By 2015 this 
proportion will reach levels of around 55%. Naturally, this 
trend is mainly due to the ageing of the large postwar 
baby-boom generations. 
Figure 14 
Population aged 40-59 as a % of population aged 
20-59-EUR 15 
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
year 
Figure 15 
Population aged 80 and over as a % of population 
aged 60 and over - EUR 15 
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
year 
All Member States will sooner or later experience these 
more specific ageing trends. Particularly Italy, Portugal 
and Spain might be confronted with a relatively long 
period of an ageing potential labour force, whereas 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden are already in the middle 
of this process. The long-term ageing of the elderly 
population will be fairly steep and strong in Italy and the 
Netherlands (Figure 16). 
After 2015 the ageing of the potential labour force will 
stagnate and probably even reverse as the less numer­
ous generations born in the 1970s are reaching the age 
of 40, while the baby-boomers are leaving the working-
age population. 
Also the EU population aged 60 and over will become 
older. After the turn of the century the share of the 
population aged 80 and over in the elderly population will 
increase almost continuously (Figure 15). Particularly 
after 2025, when the baby-boomers are passing the age 
of 80, the number of the 'very old' will rise dramatically. 
By the year 2050 their share of the elderly population 
might be more than one-third. 
Figure 16 
Population aged 80 and over as a % of population 
aged 60 and over: increase 1995-2050 
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Age dependency will rise drastically 
Figure 17 shows the observed and projected total age 
dependency ratio, i.e. the sum of the number of people 
aged 0­19 and 60+ expressed as a percentage of the 
population aged 20­59. For the Union as a whole this 
indicator has decreased since mid 1970s from 100% to 
80%, due to the sharply declining number of young 
people. 
In the next ten years the ratio will be fairly constant but 
thereafter a steady and perhaps even strong increase 
might occur. Especially if current low fertility levels per­
sist and life expectancy structurally rises (old scenario), 
the age dependency will in the long run climb to all­time 
high levels of well above 120%. 
Figure 78 demonstrates that during the next 25 years the 
increase in total age dependency will be far from uniform 
within the Union. The ratio will hardly grow in Portugal 
and Spain, whilst Finland and the Netherlands will prob­
ably have to cope with an increase well above the 
European average. 
However, by the year 2050 Italy (107­136%) and Spain 
(110­138%) are expected to be the EU countries with the 
highest age dependency (Table 6). 
Figure 17 
Age dependency ratio ­ EUR 15 
Figure 18 
Age dependency ratio: increase 1995­2020 (%) 
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Table 6 
Age dependency ratio m 
EUR 15 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portugal 
Finland 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
Iceland 
Liechtenstein 
Norway 
EEA 
1995 
OBSERVED 
80.2 
83.1 
7 6 9 
73.1 
85.0 
8 3 9 
85 7 
9 6 9 
77 7 
75 1 
72 6 
7 5 6 
85.1 
79.8 
8 7 7 
8 4 6 
90.2 
67.5 
84.5 
80.3 
2000 
OLD 
e : 3 
83 0 
76 ' 
­5 e 
82 5 
76 5 
84 6 
87 0 
' " 6 
78 5 
"3 5 
"5 7 
"9 : 
"9 9 
8" · 
54 5 
56 9 
66 5 
62 ' 
80 3 
BASELINE 
80 5 
B3 5 
' 6 ­
79 : 
83 ι 
76 7 
84 7 
87 0 
77 9 
78 7 
"4 · 
76 ' 
79 2 
80 3 
67 4 
84 J 
87 a 
66 8 
62 5 
BC 6 
YOUNG 
80 9 
83 6 
77 0 
79 3 
83 · 
7 7 2 
85 4 
86 8 
"8 3 
79 0 
74 ' 
76 3 
79 3 
80 8 
8,' 5 
85 0 
88 3 
67 3 
32 7 
60 9 
2020 
OLD 
9' 
94 
90 
68 
91 
64 
94 
B7 
90 
63 
=: 84 
c 4 
■ : : 
96 
c 9 
95 
= 9 
9' 
90 
BASELINE 
91 
96 
91 
87 
9 4 
86 
97 
88 
92 
a s 
91 
34 
36 
101 
98 
9 . 
•oo 
90 
02 
91 
YOUNG 
93 
96 
92 
69 
94 
89 
• 2 1 
91 
94 
= 6 
91 
67 
87 
104 
39 
93 
103 
9 ' 
93 
93 
2050 
OLD 
125 
121 
... ' 23 
•27 
'38 
■24 
'26 
'56 
113 
" 6 
123 
" 9 
" 7 
114 
119 
'36 
' 3 9 
115 
125 
BASELINE 
113 
• • 1 
' O í 
" 0 
" 4 
' 21 
" 6 
" 4 
" 9 
102 
' '16 
" 7 
" 6 
12 0 
105 
11c 
'26 
" 6 
106 
• •3 
YOUNG 
' 03 
102 
93 
•OO 
'06 
110 
•06 
'05 
■ " 
93 
99 
i a 
99 
' 02 
99 
■'.2 
119 
'34 
99 
" . 3 
Eurostat s new long-term population scenarios - technical explanation 
National population projections by sex and age are produced by the National Statistical Institutes (regularly and 
irregularly), United Nations (every 2 years) and Eurostat (every 3-5 years). 
The first two agencies basically aim to make population forecasts or the 'best guess' for the next 10-15 years, 
usually supplemented with uncertainty variants. Eurostat produces various population scenarios for the next 5-6 
decades, which attempt to explore realistic boundaries of demographic change in the long run. 
The new long-term population scenarios of Eurostat, compiled in 1996 with the assistance of Statistics 
Netherlands, concern the 18 countries of the European Economic Area (EEA). The scenarios cover the period 
1995-2050 and project the population at 1 January by sex and single years of age up to the age group of 90+. 
Five scenarios were prepared: baseline, low, high, young and old. 
The low and high scenario can be considered as plausible extremes with respect to population growth. The low 
scenario describes a demographic future in which current fertility levels of around 1.45 children per woman will 
persist, life expectancies will hardly increase and total net immigration for the EEA will drop from 600,000 to 
400,000 persons a year. The high scenario assumes a recovery of fertility to levels of around 1.95 children per 
woman, life expectancies continuing to increase strongly in all countries and total net inflow of migrants increasing 
to a level of 800,000 persons a year. 
The young and old scenarios can be interpreted as plausible extremes with respect to population ageing. In the 
young scenario, high fertility and high net immigration assumptions are combined with low life expectancies, 
whereas in the old scenario high life expectancies are combined with low fertility and low net immigration. 
The baseline scenario describes the 'average development' and can therefore be used as a reference. This 
scenario is generally fairly close to the latest population forecasts made by the national statistical institutes. 
The assumptions underlying the five scenarios are summarized in the following scheme: 
Fertility 
Life expectancy 
Net migration 
Scenarios 
BASEUNE 
medium 
medium 
medium 
LOW 
low 
low 
low 
HIGH 
high 
high 
high 
YOUNG 
high 
low 
high 
OLD 
low 
high 
low 
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